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“Little Boy” from California to Tinian
Island. “The Deep (July 30–August 4,
1945)” details events leading up to the
attack, the sinking, and the rescue. “Trial
and Scandal (August 5, 1945–June 30,
1949)” summarizes the legal proceedings
and argues persuasively that the process
was tainted. The last book, “An Innocent
Man (Summer 1999),” ties together the
concerted efforts of a few individuals
that led to McVay’s exoneration.
Short sections covering periods between
1997 and 2005 follow each chronological
book, tracking the efforts of Captain
William J. Toti, the skipper of USS
Indianapolis (SSN 697), Indy’s namesake
submarine, to locate Mochitsura
Hashimoto, submarine commander
who sank Indianapolis and testified at
the 1945 court-martial, and gain his
support to exonerate McVay. These
sections bolster rather than interrupt the
flow of the primary story, particularly
in the last book, and culminate with
coverage of the sixtieth-anniversary
gathering of survivors and their families
in 2005. The story concludes with
a short “Final Log Entry” about the
discovery of the cruiser 18,000 feet
below the surface of the Philippine Sea
seventy-two years after it was sunk.
In dividing their work, Vincent, a USN
veteran and author of numerous nonfiction books, focused on the delivery
of the bomb, the court-martial, and
McVay’s subsequent exoneration, while
Vladic, an acclaimed documentary filmmaker and the world’s leading expert on
Indianapolis, focused on the survivors
and their families. Their joint passion
to tell the whole story of Indy and its
crew is evident throughout the book.
While the story is well constructed
and captivating, the book is also a
well-documented, scholarly work. The
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authors combine hundreds of hours
of interviews with survivors, rescue
crews, family members, and friends with
primary sources, including official Navy
records, and numerous photographs,
charts, graphs, and maps to produce a
full understanding of what happened
and why. The “Final Sailing List,” crossreferenced from eight sources, is a fitting
tribute to the ship’s 1,195 crewmembers.
The twenty-two-page bibliography
seemingly references every document,
article, interview, film, and book ever
produced on Indianapolis, including
Doug Stanton’s New York Times best
seller In Harm’s Way: The Sinking of
the USS Indianapolis (Holt, 2001).
Supported by years of research and
hundreds of additional interviews,
Vincent and Vladic’s Indianapolis should
be the first choice for new audiences
fascinated with the excerpt from Quint’s
war story. For those familiar with the
sinking and its aftermath, Indianapolis is
worthy of your attention as the definitive
account of this World War II tragedy.
JEFFREY BOVARNICK

Kamikaze: Japan’s Last Bid for Victory, by Adrian
Stewart. Philadelphia: Pen and Sword Aviation,
2020. 209 pages. $29.95.

The very first, and possibly the second,
“suicide dive” that Japanese pilots
made in World War II occurred on
the first day of Japan’s war against the
United States, during the attack on
Pearl Harbor and other sites on Oahu.
Although as the author of Kamikaze:
Japan’s Last Bid for Victory notes, these
pilots’ missions were fundamentally
different from those that came later,
“the motives behind them help to
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explain the Kamikaze creed” (p. 3).
It was the attacks toward the end of
the war conducted by the “Divine
Wind Special Attack Unit,” which the
Imperial Japanese Navy established
officially in October 1944, that were
notorious. Although suicide attacks
were not limited to the kamikaze
aerial attacks, it is the latter intentional
rather than earlier impulsive suicide
attacks that receive the most attention.
The Japanese warrior of World War
II was a fierce opponent, one who
considered suicide charges or other
means of achieving death to be preferable to surrendering—death before
dishonor. American and Allied soldiers
and Marines fighting island by island
frequently met with stiff resistance,
including suicidal attempts to kill them,
whether in small or large numbers.
In the Allies’ methodical movement
toward the Japanese home islands,
reclamation of territory occupied by
Japanese ground forces came at a very
high cost in human life. In the waning
months of the war in the Pacific, Japan’s
airpower was diminishing much faster
than its ground forces; so too had its
power at sea largely been destroyed.
Unable to stop the tightening naval
noose around the home islands, Japan
began a new tactic of kamikaze attacks.
Adrian Stewart’s volume—consisting
of eight chapters, a sixteen-page
insert of photographs, and four
maps—provides an informative and
enjoyable study of this aspect of the war
in the Pacific theater. Although moreextensive treatments exist, this book
is worth reading as an introductory
overview of the kamikaze phenomenon.
Ideologically grounded in and inspired
by events of the Mongol invasions of
Japan in 1274 and 1281, the attacks
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drew on Japanese history, religion,
nationalism, and patriotism to attempt
to deter or delay invasion and defeat.
The first chapter, “‘Death Is Lighter than
a Feather,’ ” aptly situates the kamikaze
perspective within historic Japanese beliefs on death and defeat. Stewart makes
a distinction between suicide attacks
earlier in the war—such as those at Attu
and Guadalcanal and against USS Hornet and Enterprise—and later kamikaze
operations, but he sees in both the legacy
of the Bushido code of the samurai.
Chapter 2 views the beginnings of
kamikaze tactics in 1942, with the later
establishment of the Kamikaze Corps
prior to the Battle of Leyte Gulf. The
third and fourth chapters consider the
effects of the failure of the Japanese
SHO plan for defense of the Philippines
and those islands’ subsequent fall.
Throughout the book, Stewart skillfully
weaves together historical narrative
with presentation of pilots’ final letters
to family members, their other words,
and other evidence of their motivations.
In so doing, the author achieves the
difficult task of showing the human
element of these warriors. As he
observes, “All Kamikaze pilots, without
exception, were devoted patriots” (p.
61). Even so, the toll they exacted
on the Allies was not insignificant,
especially in the Battle of Okinawa, as
the author presents in chapter 7. During
that campaign, of March–June 1945,
1,900 kamikaze sorties sank twenty-six
ships and inflicted damage on 176
more (p. 162). As time went on, the
Kamikaze Corps relied increasingly on
ill-trained pilots and older aircraft.
Stewart’s work balances the experiences
of the attackers and of the attacked,
and in so doing shows the fighting
spirit, resolve, and capabilities of those
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who were targets of the kamikazes as
well. The final chapter, “The Moon
Rose Radiant,” presents the immediate postconflict stand-down and the
responses of surviving kamikaze pilots.
The kamikaze attacks were operational
and strategic failures, but their tactical
effects, at least psychologically, were
enormous. These warriors left a legacy
to be studied and compared with those
of other wars and other suicide warriors.
Readers interested in the personal side
and stories of the pilots will want to
supplement this volume by reading
Kamikaze Diaries: Reflections of Japanese
Student Soldiers by Emiko OhnukiTierney (University of Chicago Press,
2006) and Blossoms in the Wind: Human
Legacies of the Kamikaze by M. G.
Sheftall (NAL Caliber / Penguin, 2005).
Also not to be overlooked is the classic
1958 account by Rikihei Inoguchi and
Tadashi Nakajima, with Roger Pineau,
The Divine Wind: Japan’s Kamikaze Force
in World War II (Naval Institute Press,
repr. 2013). Yet for a first book to read
on the subject, Stewart’s Kamikaze is
very good and insightful. The separate
index of Australian, British, Japanese,
and U.S. ships is very helpful, as is
his discussion of the oft-overlooked
attacks against Australian and British
ships. It is well worth reading.
TIMOTHY J. DEMY

British Naval Intelligence through the Twentieth
Century, by Andrew Boyd. Barnsley, U.K.: Seaforth, 2020. 800 pages. $52.95.

In a most-welcome study of British intelligence bureaucracies in the modern
age, Andrew Boyd has provided a major
contribution to the historiography of
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maritime strategy. His single-volume
history provides a comprehensive,
chronological analysis of the relevant
administrative trends and key personalities and reveals many fresh insights into
the contemporary question of British
intelligence. Responding to the standard
historiographical narratives, Boyd
challenges many myths and provides
corrective observations for his readers
to consider. He examines the secret
history of the British Empire while
simultaneously considering the role of
the Dominions and Commonwealth.
From the late nineteenth century to
the present, British naval strategy has
evolved under the influence of intelligence. The bureaucracies involved
largely have remained behind closed
doors, yet intelligence organizations
have helped to define the world
into the twenty-first century.
Boyd draws from original documentary
sources—archival holdings, contemporaneous firsthand accounts, and
memoirs—to address critical problems
in the official histories and other
historiography of British intelligence,
including addressing the major myths.
Historiographical trends in recent
scholarship have muddied the waters,
and thankfully Boyd has addressed
them. By taking the chronological
approach, he has provided a better
interpretation of the bigger questions, explaining why people in the
past acted as they did at the time.
Among many other examples, Boyd
demonstrates the influence of the First
World War on efforts to renew the
transatlantic relationship between the
British Empire and the United States.
Boyd then uses this history to correct
many popular myths surrounding the
heroic story of British code breakers
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